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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Regulating the Use of Streets
Defendant was convicted of violating a curfew ordinance pro-
hibiting presence on the streets after a certain hour where such
presence is unconnected with some legitimate business, trade, pro-
fession, or occupation. Held, judgment reversed. The ordinance is
invalid as an arbitrary invasion of the inherent personal rights and
liberties of all citizens, and unconstitutional under the California
Constitution.1
This case was decided under the so-called "liberty clause" of
the California Constitution,2 which is similar to the Ninth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.3 Many of the cases involving
curfew and vagrancy laws, and other laws involving the use of the
streets, have arisen under such clauses.4 Others have arisen under
due process of law,5 privileges and immunities, 6 and equal protec-
tion of the laws."
I. "LIBERTY" CLAUSE
The cases that have arisen under the liberty clause have all
come up at the state level. No cases seem to have ever been decided
in the federal courts on the Ninth Amendment, which a reading
of Madison's work on the drafting of the Constitution will show
may have been the intended place for what is now referred to as
"substantive due process." s Cases decided under the state con-
stitutional provisions have held that, although the freedom of
I Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 306 P. 2d 601 (1957).
2 California Const. Art., 1, § 1. "All men are by nature free and inde-
pendent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protect-
ing property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
3 U. S. Const., Amend. IX. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
4Arkansas Const., Art. 2, § 29. California Const., Art. 1, § 1. ientucky
Const., § 1. Missouri Const., Art. 1, § 2. Pennsylvania Const., Art. I, § 26.
5 California Const., Art. 1, § 13, cl. 6. Iowa Const., Art. 1, § 9. Michigan
Const., Art. II, § 16. North Dakota Const., Art. I, § 13. Oklahoma Const.,
Art. II, § 7. Texas Const., Art. 1, § 13. U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Georgia Const., Art. 1, § 2-125. Indiana Const., Art. 1, § 23. Kentucky
Const., § 3. Missouri Const., Art. 1, § 13. Ohio Const., Art. I, § 2. Oregon
Const., Art. I, § 20. U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
7 U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. Virginia Const., § 11.
8 1 Annals of Congress 456.
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locomotion is subject to proper restrictions,9 the municipality may
not prohibit persons being on the streets, where such persons con-
duct themselves properly, and do not interfere with the use of the
streets.10 The state may not make it an offense to associate with
thieves or prostitutes with the intent to agree to commit an
offense." Cases based upon both state and federal provisions have
held the people have a right to travel upon the streets,'1 2 although
a curfew law for prostitutes has been upheld.13 A municipality may
prohibit obscene or indecent language, 4 and may impose liability
on a parent for the failure of his minor children to observe curfew
laws.'-
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Cases that have been decided under the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution permit the city to regulate the
parking of vehicles,' 6 to prohibit displays on the streets,17 and to
prohibit persons over twelve years of age from riding a bicycle
on the sidewalks.'8 A city may prohibit all commercial vehicles from
the streets, 19 along with children under a certain age selling papers
on the streets, even though such prohibition interferes with a child
selling religious material. 20 It seems well settled that the use of the
streets by a common carrier is a revocable privilege.21 A case
decided under a similar state constitutional provision upheld the
right of the city to require all bicycles to have lamps. 22 Cases, in
which the court did not make clear which equal protection clause
(state or federal constitution) was being cited, have held that a
0 Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 Atl. 241 (1933).
10 St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).
1 Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S. W. 628 (1896).
12 Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 17 S.W. 2d 1012
(1929).
13 Dunn v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 834, 49 S.W. 813 (1899).
14 Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark. 484 (1841).
15 People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P. 2d 498 (1945).
16 Zenith-Godley Co. Inc., v. Wiley, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 795 (1953).
'7 People v. Friedman, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 925 (1940).
18 State v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 391, 47 Atl. 602 (1900).
'9 Garneau v. Eggers, 113 N. J. L. 245, 174 Atl. 250 (1934).
20 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944).
21 Schwartzman Service Inc. v. Stahl, 60 F. 2d 1034, (W. D. Mo. 1932).
22 Des Moines v. Keller, 116 Ia. 648, 88 N. W. 827 (1902).
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city may regulate the speed of autos, 23 and the transportation of
commodities in the streets.24 The licensing of street vendors, 25 and
the prohibition of bicycles from the sidewalks,26 have also been up-
held. In a case decided under both state and federal provisions, it
has been held that a city may not prohibit displays in shop windows
which may be seen from the streets.27
III. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
In cases decided under the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it
has been held that, while the city may prevent obstruction of the
sidewalks, 28 still, the streets must be left open for the exercise of
rights of free speech and assembly.29 The city may prohibit the use
of the streets for the carrying on of business by commercial
vehicles. 30 Along the lines of free speech, the city may not prohibit
sound amplification devices, 31 although it may regulate them so that
they do not become public nuisances. 32 Cases which have been
decided under both the state and federal constitutions have affirmed
the right of the citizens to use the streets, 33 although permitting
reasonable regulations,3 4 such as limiting the use of streets for
public meetings,3 5 permitting a classification of fees to be paid by
motor vehicle operators, 36 and allowing a license tax on street
peddlers.37 In cases in which the court did not state the particular
privileges and immunities clause being applied, the municipalities
23 McGuire v. Wilkerson, 22 Okla. Crim. 36, 209 Pac. 445 (1922).
24 J. H. McLeaish & Co. v. Bindford, 52 F. 2d 151 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
25 Hughes v. Detroit, 217 Mich. 567, 187 N. W. 530 (1922).
26 Gagnier v. Fargo, 11 N. D. 73, 88 N. W. 1030 (1902).
27 People v. Osborne, 17 Cal. App. 2d 771, 59 P. 2d 1083 (1936).
2 8 Ex parte Bodkin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 208, 194 P. 2d 588 (1948).
29 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
3 0 Warley v. Board of Park Com'rs, 233 Ky. 688, 26 S. W. 2d 554 (1930).
3 1 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949).
32 Saia v. People of New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); see 28 Neb. L. Rev.
618 (1949).
33 Cleveland v. Tussey, 13 Ohio Supp. 11, 39 Ohio Law Abs. 554 (1943).
34 Denny v. Muncie, 197 Ind. 28, 149 N.E. 639 (1925).
35 Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905).
36W. A. Barber Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 229 Ind. 140, 96 N.E. 2d 108
(1951).
3 7 Rosa v. Portland, 86 Ore. 438, 168 Pac. 936 (1917); see 28 Neb. L. Rev.
289 (1949).
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have been allowed to regulate the distribution of literature and
merchandise on the streets,38 and to grant exclusive privileges to
operate motor carriers.39
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
While the courts are getting away from "substantive due
process," and starting to decide cases of this sort under the privileges
and immunities clause, where at least one student of the Constitu-
tion feels it belongs,40 still, many cases remain on the books which
talk of due process in terms of substance, and not procedure. Among
these are cases decided under the United States Constitution holding
that the city is without power to prohibit peaceful picketing,41
although permitting prohibition of picketing which will result in
violence.42 It has also been held that a city may not restrain the free
exercise of religion by requiring a certificate to solicit funds.4
3
Permissible regulations include making presence on the streets
for an unlawful purpose a crime,44 and prohibiting advertising
vehicles from the streets.45 A state due process case permitted the
city to make consorting with gamblers grounds for vagrancy
charges.46
Cases in which no constitutional provisions were cited, but
which bear resemblance to "substantive due process", have held
that the city may prohibit notorious drunkenness, 47 lewd or indecent
behavior,48 fighting,49 disorderly noise,50 and boisterous assem-
blages.51 The Nebraska Court has said that a city may prohibit the
use of the sidewalks for the selling of merchandise,52 and circulating
38 Whisler v. West Plains, Mo., 137 F. 2d 938 (8th Cir. 1943).
39 Wolf v. Cumberland Coach Corp., 297 Ky. 704, 181 S. W. 2d 51 (1944).
40 2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution (1st ed. 1953).
41 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
42 Milkwagon Driver's Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
43 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
44 McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195 Atl. 725 (1937).
45 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949).
46 Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731, 191 S. E. 791 (1937).
47 Village of Fairmont v. Meyer, 83 Minn. 456, 86 N. W. 457 (1901).
48 Billington v. Hoverman, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 637, 7 0. C. D. 358 (1927).
4 9 City of Glasgow v. Bazan, 96 Mo. App. 412, 70 S. W. 257 (1902).
50 In re Bushey, 105 Mich. 64, 62 N. W. 1036 (1895).
51 Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 102 Mich. 551, 61 N. W. 1 (1894).
52 Chapman v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N. W. 596 (1909).
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of handbills, 53 although the United States Supreme Court has
taken an opposite stand on the latter issue.54 The courts have held
that a municipality may not require a permit to make a speech on
public grounds,55 although other courts have taken a different
view. 6? But where courts do allow a permit as a prerequisite for a
public speech, the basis for issuing or denying the permit must not
be arbitrary discretion.57 In addition to these cases, it has been held
beyond the police power to prohibit being with a lewd woman.58
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A major problem involved in these statutes and ordinances is
the judicial interpretation given them. Being penal statutes, they
must be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. 59 For this
reason, courts have required a strict adherence to the elements
of the law. 0 A problem involved in curfew and vagrancy laws is
the interpretation given the words, "visible and lawful business",
found in most of these laws. Courts have generally held that these
words refer to a good and sufficient reason for being on the streets,
rather than a purpose based upon occupational necessity.5 The
curfew laws, whose purpose is to prevent crime and immoral ac-
tivity, are directed primarily to the minor, or to his parents, al-
though some impose criminal liability on persons who would seek
to persuade a person to violate the curfew laws. 62 Where adult
regulation is involved, some judges have felt that the legislature is
without authority to require adults to remain indoors after a cer-
tain hour,63 although such laws have been upheld.64 The vagrancy
53 Anderson v. State, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N.W. 149 (1903); see 9 Neb. L. Bul.
401 (1931).
54 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); see 26 Neb. L. Rev. 656 (1946).
55 Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947); see 27 Neb. L. Rev. 437
(1948).
56 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
57 Hord v. Ft. Myers, 153 Fla. 99, 13 So. 2d 809 (1943).
5s Cady v. Village of Barnesville, 4 Ohio Dec. 396 (1878).
59 State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 12 N. W. 2d 620 (1943).
60 Baxley v. United States, 134 F. 2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943).
61 Ex parte McLaughlin, 16 Cal. App. 270, 116 Pac. 684 (1911); Pen. Code
§ 647 (6).
62Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial District, 306 P. 2d 601 (Cal.
1957); Chico Municipal Code, § 684a.
63Dissent in State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P. 2d 633 (1946); Rem.
Rev. Stat. § 2688 (8), P. C. § 9131 (8).
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laws have as their purpose, not the punishment of any acts, 65 but
the prevention of crime.6 6 Statutes involved in these cases have
defined as vagrants, (1) people who, able to work, have no visible
means of support; 67 (2) a man who refuses to provide for his
family; 8 (3) persons wandering about the streets without any
visible or lawful business;69 or, (4) persons engaged in prostitution, °
gambling, 1 begging,7 2 or other various activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The regulation of streets, though necessary, should be admin-
istered in a rational way. It should not prevent, nor hamper, the
legitimate activities of the people. It is important, too, to decide
these cases under the proper constitutional provisions. The courts
should start determining just what the privileges and immunities
of citizens are, or what acts will deprive persons of the equal
protection of the laws, instead of just throwing everything into
''substantive due process." If these two provisions will not contain
all of the cases, then resort may be had to the liberty clause.
Butler D. Shaffer, '60
64 State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P. 2d 633 (1946).
65 Commonwealth v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 143 N.E. 503 (1924).
66 District of Columbia v. Hunt, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 159, 163 F. 2d 833 (D. C.
Cir. 1947).
67 People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y. 330, 199 N. E. 501 (1936); Code Cr. Proc. §
887 (1).
68 State v. Padberg, 115 S. W. 2d 72 (1938); Mo. St. Ann. § 4333, p. 3011.
69 Ex parte Mc Laughlin, 16 Cal. App. 270, 116 Pac. 684 (1911).
7OValverdi v. State, 21 Ala. App. 606, 110 So. 594 (1926); Code 1923, §
5571 (9).
7' Rodriguez v. Culbreath, 66 So. 2d 58 (1953); § 856.02, Florida Stat. 1951,
F. S. A.
7 2 People v. Denby, 108 Cal. 54, 40 Pac. 1051 (1895); Pen. Code, § 647.
